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BANKRUPTCY LAW 
IN RE GOEB: DEEMPHASIZING THE GOOD FAITH RE-
QUIREMENT OF CHAPTER 13 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In In re Goeb,t the Ninth Circuit held that a Chapter 13 
repayment plan need not provide for substantial repayment to 
unsecured creditors to have been proposed in good faith.2 Goeb 
addresses the question of the role that the good faith require-
ment plays in a Chapter 13 repayme~t plan.8 
Straight bankruptcy proceedings are governed by Chapter 7 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1978 Act).· Once bank-
1. 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Choy, J.; the other panel members were 
Schroeder, J. and Hatter, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. Id. at 1389. The debtors in Goeb proposed a five year plan which would have paid 
their secured and priority creditors in full but unsecured creditors only one cent on the 
dollar. The bankruptcy court refused to confirm the plan because they did not intend to 
substantially repay their unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy court found that the plan 
violated the good faith requirement of Chapter 13. Id. 
3. As of this writing, only four other circuits have addressed this same issue. The 
District of Columbia Circuit held that Chapter 13 plans which provided full repayment 
for secured and cosigned debts, but only provided nominal repayment to other creditors 
do not violate the good faith requirement because "section 1325(a)(3) does not require 
any particular level of minimum repayment as a prerequisite to Chapter 13 plan confir-
mation." Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit stated 
that determination of good faith must be ascertained on a case by case basis, with sub-
stantiality of repayment as one factor. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426, 431 n.14 (7th Cir. 
1982). The Eighth Circuit held that a Chapter 13 plan which proposed to pay nothing to 
any creditor was not proposed in good faith because it "amounts to an abuse of Section 
1328 (granting a more generous discharge than in Chapter 7) and of the spirit of the 
chapter, that the debtor 'make payments' under a plan." In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634, 635 
(8th Cir. 1980). In Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 970 (4th Cir. 1982), the court found 
it could not manipulate the good faith requirement of Chapter 13 so as to impose a rigid 
substantial repayment requirement. The proper course was to apply the statute as writ-
ten and let Congress impose additional requirements if it so chooses. 
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1979 & Supp. 1982). Although this note is confined to. 
the current Bankruptcy Act, a brief history of the Act is appropriate. There are basically 
four major bankruptcy acts which Congress has promulgated. The first, the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1841, repealed by the Act of March 3, 1843, 52 Stat. 614 (1843), introduced many 
of the features which are still part of current bankruptcy laws such as voluntary proceed-
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ruptcy is declared, either through voluntary or involuntary peti-
tion, the debtor is discharged from virtually all preexisting 
debts:' Chapter 13, however, is an alternative to straight bank-
ruptcy and provides the debtor an option to submit to a court 
supervised repayment plan to repay his debts over a three year 
period.6 Proceeding by way of Chapter 13 is strictly voluntary. 
As an inducement to debtors to· utilize the Chapter 13 re-
payment plan rather than straight bankruptcy, Chapter 13 offers 
several advantages over Chapter 7.7 Chief among these is the lib-
eral discharge provision which allows a debtor to discharge al-
most all of her unsecured debts.s Chapter 7, on the other hand, 
Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 introduced the wage earner repayment plan. 30 
Stat. 544, 549-66 (1898), amended by the Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 294, 36 Stat. 
838 (1910), and by the Act of May 27, 1926, Pub. L. No. 301, 44 Stat. 662, 662-68 (1926). 
Section 12 was repealed by the Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 74-696, 52 Stat. 840, 
840-940 (1938). The Chandler Act attempted to expand bankruptcy legislation after the 
ravages of the Great Depression. For a general history and analysis of this important act, 
see J. WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW or 193B-THE CHANDLER ACT (1938). The most 
current bankruptcy legislation is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
151326 (1979 & Supp. 1982). For an in-depth discussion of the history of bankruptcy in 
the United States, see generally C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 
(1935). 
5. This rather sweeping statement is heavily qualified in the bankruptcy code. 11 
U.S.C. § 524 (1979) states what effect a discharge has on the wide range of debts which 
are not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding. See infra note 8 and accompanying 
text. 
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1979) governs repayment plans. See infra notes 32-45 
and accompanying text. 
7. Chapter 7 has three key limitations. First, it prohibits discharge of debts obtained 
by fraud, 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (1979 & Supp. 1982), see note 9 infra, thereby punishing 
the dishonest debtor. Second, Chapter 7 has a six year bar on future Chapter 7 proceed-
ings, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8), thereby prohibiting the repeat debtor. Finally, Chapter 7 
does not allow a debtor to discharge certain types of liability such as student loans. See 
infra note 9. These limitations are not present in a Chapter 13 proceeding. See infra 
note 8. Also, in a Chapter 13 proceeding, the debtor is allowed to retain control of his 
property, which is not true in a Chapter 7 proceeding, in which the trustee gets owner-
ship in all of debtor's nonexempt property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1979). 
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1979) allows a debtor to discharge all debts still owed upon 
completion of the repayment plan. The only two exceptions are support payments and 
any debts whose last payment is due after the plan is completed. 11 U.S.C. §§ 513(a)(5), 
1322(b)(5) (1979). This last exception is for long term debts such as mortgage payments. 
Otherwise, all other debts are dischargeable, whether obtained by fraud or any other 
type of nondischargeable debt under Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1979) allows a 
debtor to be excused from completing the repayment plan if the situation so warrants. 
This is basically a hardship discharge. However, under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c) (1979) the 
discharge granted does not include the enumerated exceptions to discharge of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a) (1979 & Supp. 1982). Thus, if a chapter 13 debtor fails to complete the repay-
ment plan, his discharge will be limited to that of a chapter 7 liquidation. 
2
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has a long list of nondischargeable debts.9 
The existing potential for abuse-from the position of the 
unsecured creditor-arises when a debtor proposes a Chapter 13 
repayment plan for the sole purpose of taking advantage of the 
liberal discharge provisions. Chapter 13 requires only that the 
debtor's unsecured creditors receive as much repayment under 
Chapter 13 as would have been received under Chapter 7.10 
Therefore, all a debtor need do is propose a repayment plan of-
fering to pay her unsecured creditors as much as they would be 
entitled to under Chapter 7 and the plan could be confirmed.ll 
As a result, the debtor would be paying off her debts as if it were 
straight bankruptcy, but would be receiving all the benefits of a 
Chapter 13 repayment plan. The requirement that the plan be 
proposed in good faith has been imposed by Congress to insure 
that such abuses do not occur.12 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Development of and Distinction Between Chapter 13 and 
Chapter 7 
To be declared bankrupt under Chapter 7 a debtor files a 
petition with the court.18 Upon filing, an automatic stay becomes 
effective which prevents any creditor from attempting to collect 
money owed him.14 A trustee is appointed to collect the nOD-
exempt assets of the debtor at the time she declared bank-
9. 11 u.s.c. §§ 523, 727 (1979 & Supp. 1982) list the debts which a Chapter 7 debtor 
cannot discharge. They include taxes owed to the government as priority creditors, or if 
incurred as a result of making a fraudulent return; debts arising from fraud or illegality; 
any debt not listed on the Chapter 7 petition; any support obligation; any debt arising 
from the debtor's willful injury to another entity or entity's property; or any student 
loans. This list is not exhaustive and is meant only to highlight the relevant areas. 
10. 11 u.s.c. § 1325(a) (1979) lists the requirements for confirmation of a repay-
ment plan. Subsection (a)(4) states that "the value ... of property to be distributed 
under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount 
that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under Chap-
ter 7 .... " 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1979). 
11. This is so as long as the plan complies with the other applicable provisions of 
Chapter 13. See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
13. The petition can be either voluntary or involuntary. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 
(1979). 
14. Once a debtor files a petition, all collection proceedings against the debtor are 
stopped. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1979). 
3
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ruptcyl& and distribute these assets to the debtor's unsecured 
creditors pro rata, depending on their position within Chapter 
7's priority scheme.18 
Although this definition is somewhat misleading in its sim-
plicity, it is important to note that none of the debtor's post-
petition assets are involved in the repayment to her creditors. 
The only assets which go toward repaying her debts are those 
non-exempt assets she owned at the time she filed under Chap-
ter 7.17 
Straight bankruptcy proceedings created an anomolous situ-
ation for the unsecured creditor by precluding the application of 
any of the debtor's post-bankruptcy earnings to satisfy the cred-
itor's claim. IS These assets were often those upon which the 
creditor relied, as in consumer lending transactions, in extending 
the credit. 
Consumer credit is usually extended in reliance on the wage 
earner's ability to payoff the debt out of his future earnings.19 It 
is generally not extended based on the present worth of the wage 
earner's assets because creditors wanting to levy on assets in 
case of default would be frustrated by the applicable state ex-
emption laws. iO Even if the assets were not exempt, they often 
would be encumbered up to or exceeding their liquidation 
value. il The repayment alternative to straight bankruptcy was a 
response to this situation. 
15. The creditors who have undisputed allowed unsecured claims come together to 
elect a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1979). See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1979) for a detailed descrip-
tion of the trustee's duties. 
16. There exist several classes of claims and creditors which must be satisfied pro 
rata within each class prior to moving onto the next class. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1979). 
17. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1979) states that "earnings from services performed by an 
individual debtor after the commencement of the case" are not to be included as part of 
the debtor's estate. 
18. [d. 
19. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPl'CY § 1300,01 (1982). 
20. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690-690.60 (West 1980) listing what property a 
debtor may claim as exempt in a California collection proceeding. 
21. This situation is especially true today since the adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code in most jurisdictions. The U.C.C. protects purchase money lenders by cre-
ating an automatic perfected security interest in the goods the consumer bought. U.C.C. 
§ 9-302(1)(d) (1977). For example, if a consumer buys a hot tub under an installment 
contract, the seller has a perfected security interest in that hot tub. No other creditor 
can levy on the tub to satisfy his claim. 
4
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Chapter XIII of the Chandler Act of 193822 (Chandler Act) 
was the first major piece of legislation to deal with this alterna-
tive. As a result of the Great Depression, individual bankrupt-
cies increased dramatically.28 Chapter XIII's goal was to reduce 
the occurance of bankruptcy by allowing debtors to restructure 
their debt schedules. a .. Although well intended,211 several flaws in 
its system impeded its goal. First, the definition of wage earner 
under Chapter XIII included only persons whose principle in-
come came from wages, salary, or commissions,28 thereby exclud-
ing persons on social welfare programs, small business owners 
and other self-employed individuals relying primarily on trade 
credit to produce income. Second, if a married couple wanted to 
use Chapter XIII to repay debts for which they were jointly lia-
ble, both spouses had to qualify as wage earners to qualify for a 
joint petition.27 Third, the debtor had to procure the unanimous 
consent of her unsecured creditors before the plan could be ap-
proved,28 virtually eliminating any plan which paid less than the 
full amount of all unsecured debts. Last, there was a six year bar 
on subsequent discharges under this chapter.29 
22. Pub. L. No. 74-696, 52 Stat. 840, 840-940 (1938). 
23. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 13.03 (1982). No major piece of bankruptcy legisla-
tion has been enacted without being preceded by a recessionary economy. As the econ-
omy expanded, 80 did the intensity of recessions. Thus, more and more wage earning 
consumers were falling into debt and being subjected to state collection practices. The 
1978 Act was a direct result of the recession of 1974-75. See DIRECTOR AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. 
ANN. REP., Table F, at A-78 (1975). 
24. Chapter XIII required the wage earning debtor to subject his future earnings to 
the supervision of the court. This alleviated the problem of creditor harassment and 
benefitted everyone by insuring that the assets of the debtor would be equitably distrib-
uted to all creditors by the trustee. The plan would continue for a minimum of three 
years during which time the debtor would make regular payments to the court until the 
plan had been completed. There was a special discharge provision if the debtor, through 
no fault of his own, was unable to complete the plan. This was not available for the first 
three years of repayment, and was generally only granted if the debtor became disabled 
or lost his job. See J. WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938-THE CHANDLER Ac:r 
(1938). 
25. In sponsoring this act, Congre88man Chandler hoped that this new bankruptcy 
act would "usher in an era of lasting prosperity and good feeling." J. WEINSTEIN, supra 
note 24, at iii. 
26. Chandler Act of 1938 § 606(8) (repealed 1978) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 
109(e)(1979». 
27. Chandler Act of 1938 § 606(3), (6), (8) (repealed 1978) (current version at 11 
U.S.C. § 302(a) (1979». 
28. Chandler Act of 1938 §§ 651, 652 (repealed 1978) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 
1325(a)(4) (1979». 
29. Chandler Act of 1938 § 14(c)(5) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8), (9) 
(1979». For an in depth study of the flaws of chapter XIII, See Bankruptcy Act Revi-
5
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Chapter XIII was not drafted to cope with a vast expansion 
in consumer credit or with a huge increase in wage earner de-
faults. so Moreover, Chapter XIII could not deal with the rapid 
growth of consumer credit following World War II, as well as the 
effect the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code had on the 
consumer lending industry in the 1960'S.31 In response to these 
problems, Chapter XIII was repealed and replaced by Chapter 
13 of the 1978 Act.82 
The amended Chapter 13 changed the former repayment 
provisions in five ways. First, it gave debtors more flexibility in 
formulating a repayment plan.33 Second, it more particularly de-
fined the rights of secured and unsecured creditors.34 Third, it 
broadened the class of debtors. 3D Fourth, it placed a limit on the 
length of a plan.s8 And finally, it reduced indirect pressure from 
the debtor's family and friends by protecting consumer co-
debtors.37 
2. Chapter 13 Repayment Plans 
Chapter 13 enables an individual with a regular income38 to 
repay his debts out of his future income over an extended period 
of time.39 The debtor must propose a repayment plan to the 
sion, Hearings on H.R. 31 and 32 before the Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1315-
1324 (1976). For a detailed study of the conflicting role of the chapter XIII trustee, see 
Comment, The Chapter XIII Trustee: "Trustee" or Dispursing Agent?, 21 ME. L. REV. 
53 (1969). 
30. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5965-66. 
31. Id. 
32. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1330 (1979). 
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1979). This section outlines what the plan may provide for 
each class of creditor. This gives the debtor many more options when structuring the 
repayment plan than was previously available under Chapter XIII. 
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (1979). These sections outline the rights of creditors and 
those persons who have claims against the debtor. 
35. An individual with regular income is defined by the code as one "whose income 
is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a 
plan under chapter 13 .... n 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (1979). 
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(c) (1979) does not allow a court to approve a plan which will 
exceed three years, unless for cause shown, and then only up to five years. 
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(l) (1979). This section specifically prohibits creditors from 
acting against the co-debtor if the debt was created to secure a consumer good. 
38. See supra note 35. 
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1979) states that the plan shall provide for the repayment of 
the debts listed as property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1979) limits the plan to 
6
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bankruptcy court which provides for the submission of that por-
tion of the debtor's future income to the supervision and control 
of the Chapter 13 trustee as would be necessary to complete the 
plan.40 
For the plan to be confirmed, the bankruptcy court must 
find that it conforms to all applicable provisions of the bank-
ruptcy code.41 This includes having all administrative fees paid 
prior to the commencement of the plan,42 obtaining the approval 
of all the debtor's secured creditors,4a and insuring that the plan 
provides that the unsecured creditors of the debtor will receive 
what they would have under a straight bankruptcy proceeding.·· 
Finally, the court must find that the debtor will be able to com-
plete the repayment plan on time,411 and that the debtor is pro-
posing this plan in good faith.48 
The good faith requirement of section 1325(a)(3) has been 
utilized by many courts to insure that the debtor's unsecured 
creditors are substantially repaid.47 Thus, while a Chapter 13 re-
payment plan does not explicitly require substantial repayment 
to unsecured creditors, courts are reluctant to approve a repay-
ment plan unless it provides for the substantial repayment of 
unsecured creditors.48 
three years unless the court grants an extension, but only up to five years. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1979). 
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(l) (1979). 
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) (1979). 
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1979). 
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1979). 
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1979). 
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1979). 
47. See, e.g., In re Bellgraph, 6 BANK. CT. DEC. (CRR) 480 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re 
Chaffin, 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 229, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 426 (D. Kan. 
1980); In re Cloutier, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 909, 6 BANK. CT. DEC. (CRR) 196 
(D. Colo. 1980); In re Cook, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 780, 6 BANKR. CAS. DEC. 
(CRR) 219 (S.D.W. Va. 1980); In re Hall, 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 310,6 BANKR. 
CT. DEC. (CRR) 476 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Harland, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 973, 
6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 235 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Madden, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 
(MB) 1093 (S.D. OHIO 1980); In re Marlow, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MJl) 705, 6 
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 77 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Montano, 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 
(MB) 431, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 487 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Rayburn, 6 BANKR. CT. 
DEC. (CRR) 453 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
48. The good faith requirement in Chapter 13 repayment plans has sparked a great 
deal of scholarly comment. See generally Note, Good Faith, Zero Plans, and the Pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13: A Legislative Solution to the Controversy, 61 
B.U.L. REV. 773 (1981); Note, Chapter 13 De Minimus Plans: Toward a Consensus on 
7
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3. Interpretation of the Good Faith Requirement Prior to 
Goeb 
Bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Circuit have, with few 
exceptions,49 uniformly viewed the good faith requirement of 
Chapter 13 as compensating for its liberal discharge provisions:1o 
These courts have used the good faith requirement to insure 
that a debtor's repayment plan will provide for substantial re-
payment to her unsecured creditors. III The following cases from 
the various districts within the Ninth Circuit are illustrative of 
how the good faith requirement has been utilized. 
In In re Bloom,1I2 the bankruptcy court found that a one 
percent repayment plan to debtor's unsecured creditors violated 
the good faith provision of Chapter 13.118 Bloom reasoned that a 
one percent repayment plan was more like a Chapter 7 proceed-
ing because both avoided paying most of the debt.1I4 This, the 
court found, frustrated Chapter 13's goal of debt repayment.1I11 
"Good Faith", 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 593 (1981); Note, Bankruptcy: Good Faith and the 
Zero Payment Plan in Chapter 13, 69 Ky. L.J. 327 (1981); Note, Filing for Personal 
Bankruptcy: Adoption of a "Bona Fide Effort" Test under Chapter 13, 14 MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 321 (1981); Note, "Good Faith" and Confirmation of Chapter 13 Composition 
Plans: Analysis and a Proposal, 65 MINN. L. REV. 659 (1981). 
49. See, e.g., In re Webb, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 465 (N.D. Cal. 1980). In 
Webb, the court confirmed a plan which was to pay unsecured creditors only 1 % of their 
debts because they would have received nothing had the debtor gone through Chapter 7. 
As such, the plan satisfied § 1325(a)(4) which requires that in order for a Chapter 13 
plan to be confirmed, unsecured creditors must receive at least as much as they would 
under Chapter 7. The court concluded that the 1 % amount was sufficient. 
50. In re Howard, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 634 (S.D. Cal. 1980) stated that 
"[t)he draft[ers) intended debtors to deal fairly and justly with their creditors. As a re-
ward for such dealing, [Chapter 13) debtors were given the 'super' discharge provided for 
in Section 1328(a) .... " Id. 
51. In re Beaver, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 609 (S.D. Cal. 1980), stated that a 
"one percent plan ... cannot be held to constitute a meaningful attempt to repay .... " 
Id. at 615. The court also found that Congress intended the good faith requirement to 
insure that meaningful repayment would occur. Id. 
52. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
53. Id. at 1104. The debtors in Bloom owed unsecured debts totaling $273,614.00. 
The plan they submitted would have paid $2,736.14, or 1 %, back to their unsecured 
creditors. 
54. Id. at 1102. The court found that a Chapter 7 debtor has no motive to repay his 
creditors since he is seeking a discharge from debts. The court analogized this non-repay-
ment motive to a de minimus Chapter 13 repayment plan and found that "[a) debtor 
wbo files the nominal ... Chapter 13 plan is really no different. If he proposes to pay 
his creditors ... one percent of the creditors [sic) claims it cannot be honestly argued 
that this debtor wants to pay his bills .... " Id. 
55.Id. 
8
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The court also noted that the requirement a debtor be able to 
meet all payments under the plan evidenced Congress' intent 
that the Chapter 13 debtor make meaningful payments, a re-
quirement which a one percent plan does not meet.1I6 Second, 
the court contrasted Chapter 7 and 13, reasoning that the good 
faith requirement was imposed in order to compensate for the 
restrictions which apply to Chapter 7 proceedings but are absent 
from Chapter 13.117 
In In re Beauer/8 the court refused to confirm a plan which 
would have paid debtor's unsecured creditors only one percent 
of the outstanding debt.1I1I Turning to the legislative history, the 
court concluded that Congress intended for Chapter 13 to allow 
creditors to significantly reduce their losses as opposed to the 
losses they would suffer under straight bankruptcy via Chapter 
7.60 The court found that Congress wanted to discourage margi-
nal repayment plans and included the good faith requirement to 
facilitate that goal. 61 The court concluded that the good faith 
requirement meant more than honesty; good faith "requires a 
fundamental fairness in dealing with one's creditors."62 
56. 1d. at 1103. This requirement is found in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1979). The 
court also pointed out that the term "individual with a regular income" evidenced Con-
gress' intent that the payments made by the debtor be substantial in light of all the 
circumstances; otherwise the requirement of section 101(24), see note 35, supra, becomes 
useless. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 1098, 1103. 
57. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) at 1104. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying 
text. The court asked if it can "be seriously argued that Congress could have intended to 
adopt at the same time [it was imposing the restrictions on discharge in Chapter 71, a 
scheme under Chapter 13 which would render totally illusory the creditor protections 
and the debtor limitations set forth in the three principles of the dishonest debtor, the 
repeater ... , and the various exceptions to discharge? Such a congressional purpose 
seems inconceivable to me." 1d. at 1103. 
58. 1 COLLIER BANK. CAS. 2d (MB) 609 (S.D. Cal. 1980). 
59. 1d. at 615. The debtor was unemployed and supporting herself and her two chil-
dren on $580 per month unemployment compensation. She listed her assets as $955 in 
personal property all of which she declared exempt. She had $3,206 in debts to un-
secured creditors. 
60. 1d. at 613. The court found that while the Chapter 13 debtor has several benefits 
such as the retention of her property, thereby avoiding the stigma of bankruptcy liquida-
tion, the rights of unsecured creditors wera not left unconsidered by Congress. "Losses to 
creditors otherwise accruing in a liquidation were seen as being significantly reduced in a 
Chapter 13 setting." 1d. (emphasis in original). 
61. 1d. at 614. The court found that "Congress has now placed on the courts the 
responsibility to insure that fair dealing is accomplished in Chapter 13 proceedings. 
They achieved this . . . in the requirement of a specific finding of good faith before a 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
114 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:105 
The court in In re AndersonB8 found that because a debtor 
could have made a more substantial repayment to his unsecured 
creditors than the one percent repayment plan he proposed, the 
good faith requirement provision of Chapter 13 had been vio-
lated.B4 The court held that if unsecured creditors' claims are to 
be abrogated despite the debtor's ability to pay, straight bank-
ruptcy through Chapter 7 is more appropriate.BII "If such a 
debtor is to avoid bankruptcy and gain the benefits of Chapter 
13, the quid pro quo is that he should pay according to his abil-
ity and circumstances, thereby providing fairly and responsibly 
for his creditors within the spirit of Chapter 13. That is what the 
'good faith' requirement demands."BB 
In In re Burrell,67 the district court, reversing a bankruptcy 
court which had ruled that a Chapter 13 repayment plan must 
provide for a 70 percent repayment to unsecured creditors,Bs 
held that while substantial repayment to unsecured creditors is 
required in a Chapter 13 plan,BII the analysis of the bankruptcy 
court in reaching a 70 percent repayment requirement was re-
versible error.70 The court focused on the judicial construction of 
63. 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 594 (S.D. Cal. 1980). 
64. The debtors had listed unsecured debts of $10,022.00 and secured debts of 
$2,805.00. The debtors' real purpose in proposing a Chapter 13 plan was to enable a 
restructing of the contracts they had with a car company and a department store. This 
was a good faith plan under Chapter 13. rd. at 595. 
65. rd. at 596. "Where a debtor can afford to pay reasonable amounts for a reasona-
ble length of time but elects to make only token payments on his unsecured debts, the 
plan is unfair and should not be confirmed." rd. 
66. rd. at 597. 
67. 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 1019,6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 900 (N.D. Cal. 
1980), rev's 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 474, 5 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1321 (N.D. 
Cal. 1980). 
68. The debtor had submitted a plan which would have provided a 15 perclmt re-
payment to each of his unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy judge interpolated the 70% 
repayment requirement from § 727(a)(9) which sets forth the six-year bar rule for a 
Chapter 7 discharge. The six-year rule precludes the discharge of a debtor under Chapter 
7 if that debtor had previously obtained a Chapter 13 discharge within six years unless 
that plan had repaid 100% of the allowed unsecured claims or both payment of 70% of 
the claims and a finding that the plan was proposed in good faith. 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 
2d (MB) at 1024. 
69. rd. The district court stated that it "concurs with the bankruptcy court that a 
Chapter 13 plan must provide for substantial payments to unsecured creditors." rd. at 
1024-25. 
70. rd. at 1026. The court found that "[tlhe legislative history provides no support 
for the argument that Congress intended to incorporate into the confirmation standards 
of § 1325 the requirements of the exception to the six-year bar rule found in § 727(a)(9). 
In fact, the presence of those tests in § 727(a)(9) suggests that their absence in § 1325(a) 
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Chapter XIII which stated that "Congress clearly intended to 
encourage wage earners to repay their debts in full, rather than 
go into straight bankruptcy or composition . . . "71 and con-
cluded that, due to Congress' silence on this point in subsequent 
amendments, no change from this construction was intended.72 
In sum, the various bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Cir-
cuit have construed the good faith requirement as a shield to 
protect the rights of unsecured creditors when the debtor 
utilizes Chapter 13, instead of Chapter 7 with its attendant re-
strictive discharge provisions.73 Before confirming a plan, the 
bankruptcy courts have made sure that the repayment plan in 
fact provides for substantial repayment to the unsecured credi-
tors.74 Anything less than substantial repayment violates the 
good faith provision of Chapter 13, and this interpretation ac-
cords with the intent of Congress.711 
4. Legislative History 
Congress intended to encourage debtors to restructure their 
debts and avoid straight bankruptcy by going into Chapter 13 
rather than Chapter 7.78 However, Congress did not intend that 
Chapter 13 be used solely for its expansive discharge provision 
because "[iJt is also necessary to prevent Chapter 13 plans from 
turning into mere offers of composition plans under which pay-
ments would equal only the nonexempt assets of the debtor."77 
was intentional rather than accidental." Id. at 1025. 
71. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966). 
72. 2 COLLIER BANK. CAS. 2d (MB) at 1024. The court stated that "[i]f Congress had 
intended to abolish the substantiality requirement [as construed in Perry], it could have 
done so unambiguously. Because it did not, this court must conclude that no change was 
intended." Id. 
73. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
74. In re Campbell, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 653 (S.D. Cal. 1980) stated that 
"payments under a Chapter 13 plan are to be substantial .... " Id. at 656. 
75. See supra note 50. 
76. "The new chapter 13 will permit almost any individual with regular income to 
propose and have approved a reasonable plan for debt repayment based on that individ-
ual's exact circumstances. As in current law, 100 percent payment plans will be en-
couraged .... " S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 5787, 5799. See also text accompanying note 71, supra. 
77. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD NEWS 5787, 5799. The reason for this recent legislation is that the Supreme 
Court in Northern Pipeline Construction CO. V. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 
(1982) found that Congress had violated the Constitution in the 1978 Act by granting 
broad judicial powers to the bankruptcy judges without conferring on them the same 
11
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This approach finds support in the current legislation in 
Congress.78 Recent proposals attempt to tighten up the dis-
charge provisions of Chapter 13 by not allowing the debtor to 
discharge those debts which Chapter 7 would not allow." In 
sum, these bills would equalize the discharge provisions between 
Chapters 7 and 13,80 and in addition, would provide for a mini-
mum standard in order to qualify for Chapter 7.81 
The legislative history of both the 1978 Act and pending 
legislation are consistent in revealing Congress' desire to have 
debtors repay their creditors as much as they can by allowing 
the debtor to restructure her debts.82 The difference lies in the 
method to reach that result. Chapter 13 at present seeks to en-
courage repayment plans by offering an expansive discharge pro-
vision.88 The legislation currently before Congress would impose 
a mandatory repayment plan upon the debtor if she is able to 
pay at least 25 percent of her debts, and equalize the discharge 
provision of Chapter 13.8' 
C. THE Goeb DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit, in In re Goeb, stated that the term good 
faith does not mandate that substantial repayment be made to 
unsecured creditors in a Chapter 13 plan.811 The court found that 
protections accorded to judges who serve on courts established under Article III of the 
Constitution. The Court gave Congress until December 1982 to modify the 1978 Act ac-
cordingly. This has created a hugh amount of omnibus legislation aimed at re-designing 
the entire 1978 Act. 
78. "It is the intent of Congress to require the debtor to make a substantial effort to 
pay his bills." S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1982). [Hereinafter cited as 
SENATE REpORT]. 
79. Id. This bill would amend 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1979) to require that all debts 
which are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1979) be incorporated into the repay-
ment plan. 
SO. Id. This bill would conform the treatment of such debts provided for in Chapter 
13 to that accorded in Chapter 7. Id. at 27. 
81. SENATE REPORT. supra note 78, at 32. This bill would not allow a debtor to go 
into Chapter 7 unless he were unable to repay at least 25% of his outstanding debts 
through a Chapter 13 repayment plan. Therefore. if a debtor were able to payoff 25 % of 
his debt, he could not go through Chapter 7 but would be forced to go through Chapter 
13. This type of legislation demonstrate8 Congress' desire to encourage substantial re-
payment of debtors. 
82. See supra notes 71, 78 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra notes SO-81 and accompanying text. 
85. In re Goeb. 675 F.2d 1386. 1389 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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had Congress intended to establish a substantial repayment re-
quirement for Chapter 13 debtors, it could easily have done SO.86 
The only repayment requirement Congress actually set out was 
that unsecured creditors cannot be paid less than the amount 
they would have received had the estate of the debtor been liq-
uidated under Chapter 7.87 
The court reasoned that the presence of this explicit stan-
dard demonstrated that Congress did not intend to impose a 
more stringent repayment standard when it imposed a general 
good faith requirement.88 The court was not persuaded by the 
argument that the debtor would receive a windfall at the ex-
pense of his unsecured creditors if allowed to use a de minimus 
Chapter 13 repayment plan.88 To the contrary, the court found 
that pending legislation in Congress, seeking to expand the defi-
nition of good faith to include a bona fide effort on the part of 
the debtor, demonstrated that Congress intended to deal with 
the ambiguity surrounding the good faith test of Chapter 13 
without resorting to a substantial repayment requirement.8o 
The Goeb court determined that requiring substantial re-
payment was contrary to the statutory language and intent, and 
that to impose a rigid requirement under the guise of interpret-
ing good faith would be inadvisable given Congress' awareness of 
the confusion.81 The court also found that it would be more ap-
86. "Had Congress wished to require all Chapter 13 debtors to substantially repay 
unsecured creditors, it could have spoken explicitly." 675 F.2d at 1388. 
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1979) states that: 
The court shall confirm a plan if . . . the value, as of the effec-
tive date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the 
plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less 
than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the es-
tate of the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this title 
88. 675 F.2d at 1388. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. at 1389. An excerpt of the House Report reads in part: 
In short, the 'good faith' effort test looks to the present and 
future ability of the debtor to make payments into the Chap-
ter 13 creditor's fund during the course of the plan, while the 
traditional 'good faith' test examines the intentions of the 
debtor and the legal effect of the confirmation of a Chapter 13 
plan in light of the spirit and purposes of Chapter 13. 
H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1980). 
91. 675 F.2d at 1389. 
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propriate for Congress to specify the conditions for confirmation 
of Chapter 13 plans.92 
Having determined that the good faith requirement of sec-
tion 1325 did not mandate substantial repayment to a Chapter 
13 debtor's unsecured creditors, the court then outlined what 
findings must be made before deciding whether a Chapter 13 
debtor acted in good faith. The court utilized a definition of 
good faith which the Supreme Court had construed under Chap-
ter IX of the Chandler Act embodying principles of equity and 
good conscience.93 The Goeb court found that, as a court of eq-
uity, it should determine whether debtors acted equitably in 
proposing their Chapter 13 plan, and did not seek to unfairly 
manipulate the bankruptcy code.9• In determining the good faith 
of the debtor, substantiality of repayment is only one of a num-
ber of relevant considerations which must be weighed.91i 
Considering the plan before it, the court found that the 
debtors had proposed their plan in good faith because it pro-
vided 100 percent payment to both secured and priority credi-
tors which might not have occurred had the debtors gone 
through Chapter 7.98 In addition, the unsecured creditors would 
have received nothing in a Chapter 7 proceeding, so a de mini-
mus Chapter 13 repayment plan did not violate Chapter 13's in-
tent.97 Finally, the proposed plan did not leave any surplus to 
the debtors.98 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 1390. In American United Mutual Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 
138 (1940) the Court interpreted a condition on the conformation of a plan under former 
Chapter IX that it be offered in good faith. In attempting to define what good faith was, 
the Court premised the determination with the general requirement that the debtor be 
able to qualify for equitable relief, since bankruptcy proceedings are an equitable rem-
edy. Thi8 is basically the clean hands doctrine. [d. at 145. 
94. 675 F.2d at 1390. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 1391. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. Contrast this result with the debtor in Anderson, supra notes 63-66 and ac-
companying text. That debtor had a great deal of surplus in assets after proposing his de 
minimus plan. Although not highlighted in Goeb, it is quite possible that those debtors 
not having any surplus after the provisions of the plan were implemented may have 
demonstrated sufficient good faith. After all, the thrust of the courts has been to follow 
Congress' intent in Chapter 13 plans, and Congress has stressed that each individual pay 
according to her ability. See supra note 90. 
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The court cautioned that Goeb was not a general endorse-
ment of de minimus repayment plans under Chapter 13,88 and 
that while this consideration is relevant to a showing of bad 
faith, it is not determinative. loo A finding that the Chapter 13 
debtor acted in bad faith cannot be made solely on the evidence 
of a de minimus repayment plan to her unsecured creditors.lol 
The Goeb court stressed that one must look at the totality of the 
circumstances of a particular debtor's situation before determin-
ing whether the debtor has proposed his Chapter 13 plan in 
good faith. lOS 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Ninth Circuit in Goeb rejected the interpretation that 
the good faith requirement mandates substantial repayment to a 
Chapter 13 debtor's unsecured creditors. The Goeb approach re-
quires that the good faith inquiry be expanded beyond merely 
the amount of repayment, to include all relevant factors of a 
debtor's situation. loa While this approach has merit, it ignores 
several factors. 
First, although Goeb correctly pointed out that the term 
"good faith" was not defined by Congress/Of the opinion did not 
discuss the legislative history which demonstrates Congress' in-
tent to have Chapter 13 debtors repay a larger percentage of 
their debts than Chapter 7 debtors. 1011 Goeb did not address the 
legislative history beyond the specific definition of good faith. I" 
Second, Goeb found that pending legislation, which would 
add a "bona fide effort" condition to the section 1325(a) require-
99. 675 F.2d at 1391. 
100. Id. The court criticized the bankruptcy court (or concluding that the debtors 
had acted in bad faith primarily on their de minimus repayment plan. Id. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. "[B)ankruptcy courts cannot substitute a glance at the amount to be paid 
under the plan for a review of the totality of the circumstances." [d. 
103. [d. at 1390. The court emphasized that the term "good faith" should be con-
strued to include as many factors as pOSlJible. [d. at 1390 n.9. 
104. [d. at 1390. 
105. The House Report notes that creditor's IOBBes under Chapter 13 "will be signifi-
cantly less than i( their debtors opt (or straight bankruptcy." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6079. 
106. "Congress did not specially define 'good faith', and the term by itself is suffi-
ciently ambiguous to tolerate many interpretations .... [W]e hesitate to infer from it 
an inflexible requirement like the one applied by the court below," 675 F.2d at 1388. 
15
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ments for confirmation of a repayment plan,lo7 evidences Con-
gress' attempt to resolve the good faith quandary without having 
to resort to a substantial repayment requirement. lOS The term 
"bona fide effort" is as ambiguous as the term "good faith"; 
neither offers a quantifiable standard. Goeb found however that 
this addition would resolve the good faith-substantial repayment 
requirement controversy.IOe In any event, Goeb found it advisa-
ble to allow Congress to resolve the substantial repayment issue 
rather than impose a rigid interpretation of the good faith 
requirement. no 
The Goeb opinion noted that Congress may have put the 
flexible good faith requirement into the code instead of a rigid 
repayment standard so that courts could adapt the confirmation 
requirements of section 1325(a) to meet the particular needs of 
debtors. The court concluded that good faith should be deter-
mined only after all factors have been considered in a particular 
debtor's situation.1l1 While taking the totality of the debtor's 
situation into account, the court did not however, take all of 
Congress' intent into account, something which the bankruptcy 
courts did.11lI 
The role of the good faith requirement in a Chapter 13 re-
payment plan has been altered by Goeb from a de facto require-
ment for substantial repayment to unsecured creditors into a 
broader, more diffuse requirement. The concern is that Goeb 
may have broadened the good faith requirement too far, thereby 
severely weakening it. 
107. S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Se88. 18 (1981). 
108. 675 F.2d at 1389. 
109. 1d. In support of its conclusion, the court cited to a report of the bill in which 
the Committee on the Judiciary noted that the good faith requirement was not meant to 
be construed as requiring substantial repayment, but the court then backed away from 
that authority by saying that that statement by a "handful of senators in a se88ion three 
years after the passage of the Bankruptcy Code does not prove much." 1d. at 1389 n.6. 
110. 675 F.2d at 1389. 
111. 1d . . at 1390. 
112. See supra notes 49-75 and accompanying text. Therefore, while the various 
bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Circuit may have been too strict in requiring sub-
stantial repayment regardless of the debtor's situation, Goeb may go too far in the other 
direction by not considering Congre88' desire to encourage repayment. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in Goeb rejected the rigid interpretation 
of the good faith requirement as mandating substantial repay-
ment to a debtor's unsecured creditors. While the bankruptcy 
courts within the Ninth Circuit may have been too strict in 
holding a Chapter 13 debtor to substantial repayment, Goeb has 
ignored the desire of Congress that Chapter 13 plans encourage 
a higher repayment percentage than straight bankruptcy. The 
result in Goeb may mean that Congress will have to legislate 
into the code a more quantifiable requirement for repayment in 
order to achieve its goal of substantial repayment under Chapter 
13. 
Robert Lowney* 
• Third year student. Golden Gate University School of Law. 
17
Lowney: Bankruptcy Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
